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Abstract 
This paper provides a characterisation of the redistributive effects of agricultural policy, 
which yields consistent measures of horizontal inequities in the provision of support arising 
from both unequal treatment of pre-transfer income equals and systematic reranking of pre-
transfer income unequals.  An illustrative study shows that the distribution of support would 
have reduced farm income inequality in Scotland but for the adverse redistributive 
consequences of horizontal inequities, although neither systematic discrimination between 
farm types nor systematic reranking proves to be the major source of such inequities.  The 
imperfect targeting of support revealed by the empirical findings has implications for policy 
design. 
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1. Introduction 
The improvement of the income position of the agricultural community is a prominent if 
poorly defined objective of agricultural policy in many countries.  In particular, one of the 
main objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is ‘to ensure a fair standard of 
living for the agricultural community, in particular by increasing the individual earnings of 
persons engaged in agriculture’ (European Union, 2002: Article 33).  However the impact of 
farm support programmes on the distribution of income among farmers has received little 
explicit consideration in the mainstream literature on the redistributive effects of agricultural 
policy which has focused instead on the optimal choice of instruments to transfer surplus from 
consumers and taxpayers to producers, that is on efficiency rather than equity issues.  The 
conventional wisdom on the subject is summarised in Organisation of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD, 2003) which argues that farm support measures do not change the 
income distribution in any significant way because they are still primarily based on 
production or production factors.  Moreover the generic nature of many measures implies that 
the bulk of support goes to farms that do not need it.  OECD agricultural ministers (OECD, 
1998) have identified equity and targeting as operational criteria for policy evaluation. 
In general terms, the redistributive effect of agricultural policy may be defined as the 
difference between the inequality of farm incomes without and with the transfers accruing 
from the provision of support.  In a series of papers, Allanson (2005a, 2005b, 2006) finds that 
the CAP would have reduced inequality in Scottish farm incomes, both in absolute and 
relative terms, but for the adverse distributional consequences of horizontal inequities induced 
by farm support measures.  But whereas Allanson (2005b) identifies horizontal inequities 
with the violation of the classical principle of the equal treatment of pre-transfer income 
equals, Allanson (2005a, 2006) associates them with the procedural unfairness manifest in the 
reranking of farms between the pre-transfer and post-transfer income distributions.  The first 
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approach leads Allanson (2005b) to conclude that the CAP is ineffective as a redistributive 
tool because the poor targeting of support results in wide differences in the level of benefits 
received by farmers with the same level of pre-transfer farm income, whereas the second 
prompts Allanson (2005a, 2006) to speculate that the main problem is that farmers have to 
engage in otherwise unprofitable activities in order to benefit from support.  The main 
methodological contribution of this paper is to provide a framework in which the two 
conceptually distinct notions of horizontal inequity (HI) can be jointly measured in a 
consistent manner so as to better inform the design of agricultural policy. 
The seminal paper on the joint measurement of classical HI and reranking effects is 
Aronson et al. (1994) which proposes a decomposition of the change in inequality due to the 
unequal treatment of pre-transfer equals.  Duclos et al. (2003) have since established a clear 
normative basis for this type of decomposition by distinguishing between welfare losses due 
to aversion to post-transfer income uncertainty and relative deprivation respectively.  But this 
distinction is of little practical import from a policy design perspective as the common 
response to both concerns will be to reduce the degree of dispersion of post-transfer incomes 
about expected levels conditional upon pre-transfer income.  Furthermore, Aronson et al. 
(1994) explicitly rule out consideration of systematic reranking due to the presence of non-
monotonicities in the relationship between pre-transfer and expected post-transfer incomes, on 
the grounds that such reranking will constitute an intentional vertical policy effect.  But the 
presence of income traps in transfer schedules may more often reflect a defect of policy 
design, in that economic agents will face positive incentives to reduce their pre-transfer 
incomes over some range, thereby increasing welfare dependence and policy costs.   
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Accordingly, this paper offers an alternative decomposition between a classical HI effect 
due to the unequal treatment of pre-transfer equals and a systematic reranking effect, where 
the former is further decomposed, in the spirit of Kakwani and Lambert (1999), to provide 
measures of the effect of systematic discrimination between different groups of farmers.  The 
key to the methodology is the specification and estimation of a set of ‘reference’ functions 
that determine the post-transfer incomes that farmers with a given level of pre-transfer income 
would receive in the absence of particular sources of HI.  The overall redistributive effect of 
policy, measured as the difference between the absolute Gini indices of pre-transfer and post-
transfer incomes, can thereby be decomposed into a vertical equity component, which is 
determined by the progressivity and scale of support, and the various sources of HI.  The 
resultant measures serve to characterise the redistributive properties of the observed provision 
of support given the existing distribution of pre-transfer incomes.  That is to say, the measures 
do not allow for the impact of policy-induced changes in farm production choices, the state of 
agricultural input and output markets or agricultural structures on either the incidence of 
transfers or pre-transfer incomes.  Nevertheless, the approach usefully offers a novel 
perspective on the redistributive performance of agricultural policy.   
The paper is organised as follows.  The next section introduces the measures that are used 
to characterise and quantify the redistributive effects of agricultural policy.  The third section 
presents an empirical illustration based on weighted micro-level data from the Scottish Farm 
Accounts Survey for the financial years 2000/01 through 2004/05.  The final section offers a 
summary and some brief concluding remarks on the implications of the empirical findings for 
the design of agricultural policy. 
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2. Measurement of the redistributive effects of agricultural policy 
Adopting the standard change-in-inequality approach, the redistributive effect of agricultural 
policy is defined as the difference between the inequality of pre-transfer and post-transfer 
farm incomes.  However, the choice of inequality measure for this purpose is constrained by 
the incidence of negative farm incomes or losses, because many standard aggregative measure 
of inequality are either undefined for negative incomes (Amiel et al., 1996) or, if defined, do 
not give rise to well-behaved measures of redistribution if pre-transfer incomes are negative 
on average.1  In particular, conventional measures of relative inequality are not suitable for 
the purpose because the sign of this type of measure is determined by the sign of average 
income.  Thus if average pre-transfer income is negative whereas average post-transfer 
income is positive then the resultant measure of redistribution will be negative irrespective of 
the effect of support on inequality (Allanson, 2006).  
One solution to this problem is to base the analysis on some measure of absolute 
inequality.  These measures have the appealing property for the study of farm support 
programmes that they are invariant to equal absolute changes to all incomes.  Thus a flat-rate 
payment to all farmers will be deemed to be distributionally neutral in that it will have no 
effect on absolute inequality.  In contrast, relative inequality measures are scale invariant such 
that a policy which changes all incomes in the same proportion will be judged to have no 
redistributive effect.  But the presumed proportionality of transfers is precisely the basis of the 
widespread criticism of existing farm support programmes as poorly targeted and inequitable 
(see, inter alia, European Commission (EC), 2002; OECD 2003; Oxfam 2004). 
Accordingly, R=AX-AY  is defined as an index of the overall redistributive effect of farm 
income support, where AX  and AY  are the absolute Gini indices of pre-transfer and post-
transfer incomes respectively.  The absolute Gini index A is defined as half the average 
absolute difference between all distinct pairs of incomes in the population.2  But it is also 
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equal to the product of the (ordinary) Gini coefficient G and average income y , which 
suggests a normative interpretation of R with reference to the welfare measure 
W= ( ) AyGy −=−1  of Sen (1973).  Let WY be welfare in the post-transfer income distribution 
and WE be welfare under a hypothetical policy of flat-rate payments equal in total value to the 
actual support programme, then R=WY−WE, since AE=AX, which can be interpreted as the 
monetary value of the redistributive effects of the policy expressed on an individual farm 
basis.  That is to say, R represents how much more or less would have to be given to each 
farmer under the distributionally neutral policy of flat-rate payments to yield a welfare level 
equal to that under the actual support programme. 
 
2.1 Decomposition of the overall redistributive effect  
The key to the decomposition of the index of overall redistributive effect R into horizontal and 
vertical components is the specification and estimation of a set of ‘reference’ functions, where 
each function provides a unique mapping from pre-transfer to post-transfer incomes in the 
absence of a particular source of HI (see Jenkins and Lambert, 1999).  The full decomposition 
yields R = HW + HB + HR + V, where HW and HB measure the redistributive effects of within 
and between farm type sources of classical HI, HR is a systematic reranking effect, and the 
‘pure’ vertical equity component V is determined by the scale and progressivity of transfers 
The starting point for the decomposition procedure is the observation that the provision 
of agricultural support in most countries comprises a number of more or less distinct 
commodity regimes, with the incidence of transfers within each regime typically determined 
by some particular combination of current and/or historical levels of production and/or factor 
usage.  For example, the CAP consists of various common market organisations that differ 
both in terms of the choice of support instruments and the overall level of support that is 
provided to farmers (see Agra Informa (2006) for a comprehensive guide).  To explore the 
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implications of the commodity organisation of agricultural policy requires the specification of 
not one but a whole set of reference functions, where each function would ideally apply to a 
discrete group of farmers producing a particular commodity (e.g. cereal growers, milk 
producers etc.).  However many farms produce more than one commodity and farm accounts 
data typically do not permit identification of the contribution of each to overall farming 
income due to the incomplete allocation of costs.  Accordingly, separate functions are defined 
not for each producer group but for distinct sub-populations of farms producing more or less 
similar combinations of commodities (e.g. cereal farms, dairy farms etc.). 
Consider a population of N farms made up of an exhaustive set of K mutually exclusive 
farm types (k = 1,... K).  Let y=(y1,… yk,… yK), t=(t1,… tk,… tK) and x=(x1,… xk,… xK)  be 
the vectors of observations on post-transfer income, transfers and pre-transfer incomes 
respectively, where yk, tk, and xk are constituent sub-vectors of observations on farms of type 
k.  Following Aronson et al. (1994), the relationship between post-transfer and pre-transfer 
incomes is written as:  
yk  =  gk(xk) + εk  =  E[yk| xk] + εk  =  xk +  E[tk| xk] + εk;      k = 1,….K    (1) 
where gk(xk) is identified as the reference function for type k farms and defined as the farm 
type specific expected value of post-transfer income conditional upon pre-transfer income; 
and εk is interpreted as a vector of ‘disturbance’ terms having zero mean at each pre-transfer 
income level.  The shape of the farm type reference functions will be determined by the way 
in which expected transfers vary with pre-transfer income, where the magnitude of both will 
be roughly proportionate to the scale of production as a general rule.  However the precise 
form of this relationship will not typically be specifiable given the complexity of both 
commodity regimes and agricultural production processes.  Accordingly, the set of gk(xk) 
functions are simply assumed to be continuous, smooth functions, yielding a non-parametric 
model with only very weak constraints on its structure.  The disturbance term εk allows for the 
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possibility that farms of type k with identical pre-transfer incomes may receive different levels 
of support due to differences in natural resource endowments, managerial ability and 
historical development.  For example, commodity regimes in which the receipt of support is 
linked to current input and output levels are likely to give rise to some dispersion of transfers 
since a range of input and output combinations may be associated with any given level of pre-
transfer income due to differences between farms in the utilisation and productivity of 
resources.  While in decoupled payment schemes based on historical entitlements, any link 
between the incidence of support and pre-transfer incomes through current production choices 
is expressly broken.  
 
Identification of HW and HB 
The characterisation of post-transfer incomes given by (1) allows for two possible sources of 
classical HI.  First farms of type k with identical pre-transfer incomes may have different 
post-transfer incomes due to the disturbance term εk, with the degree of dispersion of post-
transfer incomes yk about the conditional mean E[yk| xk] reflecting the extent of within type 
HI.  Only if εk=0 will there be a one-to-one mapping from pre-transfer to post-transfer 
incomes for type k farms and hence no within type HI.  Accordingly, 
hW(x)=(g1(x1),…gk(xk),…gK(xK)) is interpreted as the vector of post-transfer incomes that the 
population of farms would receive in the absence of within type HI.  Let AW be the absolute 
Gini index of hW(x) then HW=AW–AY, that is within type HI is measured as the difference in 
inequality between hW(x) and y, which will be non-positive.3  
The other potential source of classical HI is due to systematic discrimination between 
farm types.  As the gk(xk) functions are type specific, farms with identical pre-transfer 
incomes may have different expected post-transfer incomes depending on type, with the scale 
of divergences between the functions reflecting the extent of between type HI.  Only if 
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gk(xk)= g(xk) ∀k, and hence hW(x)=g(x), will there be a one-to-one mapping from pre-transfer 
incomes to expected post-transfer incomes for all farms and hence no between type HI.  The 
measurement of between type HI requires the identification of a non-discriminatory reference 
function hB(x) determining the post-transfer incomes that the whole population of farms could 
expect to receive in the absence of discrimination between farm types.  In the absence of any 
established theory to guide the specification of this function and in keeping with the treatment 
of within type HI, hB(x) is specified on the assumption that discrimination between farm types 
changes the distribution but not the overall value of transfers at any given pre-transfer income.  
It follows that hB(x)=E[y| x], that is the mean value of post-transfer income conditional upon 
pre-transfer income but not farm type, will be given as a weighted sum of the post-transfer 
income functions for the individual types: 
hB(x) = ∑
=
K
k 1
 wk(x) gk(x);        ∑
=
K
k 1
 wk(x) = 1 (2) 
where the weights wk(x) are locally determined by the relative frequencies of the farm types at 
any given pre-transfer income, rather than being globally determined by the proportions of 
each type in the population, and 1 is the unit vector.  Let AB be the absolute Gini index of 
hB(x) then HB=AB–AW, that is between type HI is measured as the difference in inequality 
between hB(x) and hW(x), which will again be non-positive.4 
By definition, total classical HI will equal the sum of within and between type classical 
HI, that is HW+HB=AB-AY .  Only if y=hB(x) will there be a one-to-one mapping from pre-
transfer to post-transfer incomes for all farms and hence no classical HI.  More generally, the 
degree of dispersion of post-transfer incomes y about the non-discriminatory function hB(x) 
will reflect the total extent of classical HI in the provision of agricultural support.   
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Identification of HR and V 
The identification of the contribution of classical HI to the overall redistributive effect R, 
leaves a residual equal to the difference in inequality between pre-transfer and non-
discriminatory post-transfer incomes, AX-AB .  The final step in the decomposition procedure 
rests implicitly on the construction of a further reference function hR(x), which assigns the r’th 
(r=1,...N) largest non-discriminatory post-transfer income to the observation ranked r in the 
distribution of pre-transfer income x, to decompose this residual along the lines of Kakwani 
(1984) into separate horizontal and vertical equity components:  
VHCyGxGCyAA RBBXBBBBX +=−+−=− ][][  (3) 
where GX  and GB  are the (ordinary) Gini coefficients of pre-transfer and non-discriminatory 
post-transfer income, x  and  yyB =  are the corresponding mean incomes, and CB  is the 
concentration index obtained when non-discriminatory post-transfer incomes are ranked by 
pre-transfer income.5   
The ‘horizontal’ component HR  in (3) measures the redistributive effect of systematic 
changes in the ranking of farms between the pre-transfer and non-discriminatory post-transfer 
income distributions, where [CB  – GB] may be identified as the reranking index of Atkinson 
(1980) and Plotnick (1981).6  HR  is non-positive by definition (Atkinson, 1980), implying that 
any systematic reranking that does occur has a negative impact on the overall redistributive 
effect R.  Only if hB(x) is increasing in x over the whole range of pre-transfer incomes will 
there be no systematic reranking of farms.  Note that monotonicity of the farm type functions 
in (1) is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition because the slope of hB(x) is also sensitive 
to farm type composition effects given the local determination of the weights in (2). 
Finally the vertical equity component V = [ BBX CyGx − ] =- CTB Bt  provides a measure of 
the effects of differences in non-discriminatory policy transfers between farms with different 
pre-transfer incomes, which may be interpreted as an index of gross redistributive effect.  This 
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in turn depends on the distribution and scale of policy transfers where CTB  is the concentration 
coefficient of non-discriminatory transfers ranked by pre-transfer income7 and Bt  is the mean 
level of non-discriminatory transfers.  Let D=- CTB  be a disparity index that is positive 
(negative) if support is progressive (regressive) in absolute terms such that mean non-
discriminatory transfers are a decreasing (increasing) function of pre-transfer income, and that 
equals zero if the transfer schedule is uniform.  For any given D, the gross redistributive effect 
of the policy will be proportional to the average level of non-discriminatory transfers Bt .  In 
general, V will be greater (i.e. more positive) than R due to the various sources of HI that will 
typically undermine the redistributive effectiveness of policy.   
 
2.2 Reference function estimation  
The set of farm type reference functions (1) can be estimated from a sample consisting of nk 
observations on pre-transfer and post-transfer incomes for each farm type.  The estimation of 
these functions implicitly resolves the identification problem inherent in classical approaches 
to the measurement of HI in the absence of observations on exact pre-transfer income equals 
(Duclos and Lambert, 2000).  The choice of a suitable non-parametric technique for the 
purpose gets round the need to impose any parametric assumptions on their form. 
 Here the variable span smoother of Sasieni (1998) is used to fit a local linear regression 
to the observations on yk and xk in the neighbourhood of each data point in the sample.  The 
number of observations used to fit the model at each data point is determined by the variable 
span of the smoother, which is calculated by initially choosing the span at each data point that 
minimises the cross validated mean squared prediction error and then smoothing the resultant 
series of values.8  The use of a local linear regression estimator may be expected to provide a 
reasonable approximation to gk(xk) so long as the curvature of the unknown function is not 
excessive.  In contrast, the local mean estimators that have commonly been employed in the 
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literature on the measurement of classical HI (see, for example, Kakwani and Lambert, 1999; 
Van der Ven et al., 2001; Rodríguez et al., 2005) would likely be subject to bias as the slopes 
of the reference functions are expected to be non-zero and the spacing of sample observations 
on pre-transfer incomes is not uniform (Hastie and Loader, 1993).  Furthermore the choice of 
estimator allows the use of inferential procedures that are analogous to those familiar from the 
least-squares fitting of parametric functions (Cleveland and Devlin, 1988). 
The non-discriminatory function hB(x) can in principle be calculated using (2) given the 
non-parametric estimates of the farm type functions gk(xk) and kernel density estimates of the 
weight functions wk(xk) (see Kakwani and Lambert, 1999).  However, reliable estimates of the 
weights functions will not be obtainable if, as will usually be the case, the number of 
observations on each farm type is limited to such an extent that it results in sparseness of the 
data over the observed range of pre-transfer incomes.  An alternative approach is therefore 
adopted in which hB(x) is directly estimated using the same local regression technique that is 
used to estimate the set of functions in (1), but applied to the pooled sample of n=∑nk 
observations.  This procedure ensures that the predicted level of non-discriminatory post-
transfer income at any given level of pre-transfer income will automatically reflect the farm 
type composition of the sample in the neighbourhood of that point.  Finally the reference 
function hR(x) can be obtained simply by reassignment of the estimates of non-discriminatory 
post-transfer income.   
 
3. Illustrative application: Scotland, 2000/01-2004/05 
The methodology is illustrated by an empirical study of the redistributive effects of 
agricultural support in Scotland.  The study is based on weighted micro-level data from the 
Scottish Farm Accounts Survey (FAS) for the financial years 2000/01 through 2004/2005, the 
most recent year for which results are available and the last before the replacement of most 
production-related direct support payments by the decoupled single farm payment.   
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3.1 Data 
Calculation of measures of redistributive effect requires access to individual farm data on pre-
transfer and post-transfer incomes.  The FAS is an annual survey of approximately 450 full-
time farms carried out on behalf of the Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs 
Department (SEERAD) and provides the main source of microeconomic data on farm 
businesses in Scotland.9  The survey is conducted on an accounting year basis with a typical 
year-end in early March so, for example, the 2000/01 FAS centres on the 2000 production and 
subsidy year.  The farms in the survey are chosen to be representative of their size and type, 
where the economic size of the business is measured in terms of standard gross margin prior 
to 2003/04 and standard labour requirement thereafter, and the farm type classification is 
based on the relative importance of the various crop and livestock enterprises in terms of 
standard gross margin.10  Data is collected on a wide range of physical and financial variables, 
including crop areas, livestock numbers, quotas, production, sales, revenues, subsidies and 
costs, which allows for the identification of both farm income and policy transfers.  The data 
is weighted by size and type according to the number of farms enumerated in the annual June 
Agricultural Census, to yield summary statistics for the population of full-time farms.  Given 
an average population of 14416 farms in the sampling frame, the average sampling fraction 
for each size and type is 2.9 per cent over the period. 
Post-transfer income is measured by Cash Income, which is a measure of farm income 
that represents the cash return to the group with an entrepreneurial interest in the farm11 for 
their manual and managerial labour and on all their investment in the business.  As the 
difference between total receipts and total expenditure, the measure is interpreted as 
corresponding closely to the income position as perceived by the farmer (Department of the 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 2002).  Nevertheless, the FAS does not 
provide sufficient information on either non-farm sources of income or farm household 
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composition to support an analysis of the distributional effects of support on the overall 
welfare of the agricultural community.  The analysis is conducted at the farm level rather than 
per unit of unpaid labour because of doubts concerning the relevance and reliability of data on 
the unpaid labour input in the UK context (see Hill 1991).  
Pre-transfer income is simply defined as Cash Income less the net value of transfers due 
to the provision of support, where the latter is assumed equal to that part of gross support 
which accrues to farm occupiers as owners of factors of agricultural production.  Three types 
of support are identified in the analysis.  First, with respect to market price support measures, 
estimates are taken from the OECD PSE database (OECD 2005) of the gap between domestic 
market and border prices for the main agricultural commodities, measured at the farmgate 
level.  These estimates are used to calculate the impact of price support in terms of inflating 
both the market value of observed output quantities and the cost of purchased feed and seed 
inputs.  Second, direct support payments cover those payments made under CAP direct 
support schemes (also known as ‘Pillar I’ schemes).12  In calculating the net value of these 
payments, account is taken of the implicit loss in revenues resulting from obligatory set-aside 
requirements under the Arable Area Payment scheme.  Third, the value of other grants and 
subsidies includes all other payments to farmers except for those in respect of permanent 
improvements. 
 The net value of this support to farmers will depend on the extent to which it results in 
increased returns to the farm-owned factors of production, including management, and hence 
in increased farm incomes.  Following OECD (2003, Part II), the static effect on farm income 
of a unit increase in output revenues, whether due to market price support, output payments or 
a reduction in set-aside requirements, is identified as the combined cost share of the farm-
owned factors of production, while that of a unit increase in direct payments, grants or 
subsidies to individual inputs (i.e. land and breeding livestock) is simply the farm-owned 
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share of those inputs.  This approach recognises that farmers may not be the ultimate 
beneficiaries of agricultural support programmes, which may also serve to benefit landlords, 
hired workers, and off-farm input suppliers among others.  Moreover, the effective incidence 
of support is allowed to vary depending on the way in which that support is provided. 
Estimates of factor cost shares are obtained on the assumption that Scottish agriculture 
may be characterised by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production technology exhibiting 
constant returns to scale.13  Farm-specific fixed effects are included in the model to allow for 
the (fixed) management input (Mundlak, 1961), and the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function estimated by means of the within-groups estimator using an unbalanced 
panel consisting of the weighted FAS data for 2000/01 through 2004/05.  The results reported 
in Table 1 yield cost shares estimates for total labour, land and buildings, livestock capital, 
and all other purchased inputs of 12.9%, 6.6%, 17.2%, and 38.4% respectively.  With these 
attributable costs accounting for 75.2% of total revenue, the residual 24.8% is identified as the 
return to the farmer’s management.  Farm-owned shares of factors of production are derived 
for each farm in the FAS sample, with 81.3% of labour, 57.4% of land and buildings and 
100% of livestock capital being supplied on average by farmers over the period.  Hence the 
average benefit to farmers of an extra £1 of market price support or output-related payments, 
of area-related payments, of headage payments, subsidies or grants on breeding livestock, and 
of purchased input subsidies, would have been £0.564, £0.574, £1 and £0 respectively. 
 
3.2 Empirical findings 
The upper panel of Table 2 presents weighted summary statistics by year for all farm types.  
Average post-transfer income per farm was positive throughout the period, although a small 
proportion of farms in each year recorded losses in spite of the support available.  The main 
source of support was provided in the form of direct payments but market price support was 
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also significant with domestic producer prices for most livestock products remaining well 
above corresponding world price levels.  Leakages to other owners of factors of production 
mean that farmers are estimated to have received only 66% of the gross value of support on 
average.  Nevertheless, the value of these transfers to farmers was of the same order of 
magnitude as post-transfer incomes throughout the period, implying that average incomes 
would have been close to zero had it not been for the provision of support.  Indeed more than 
half of farms in each year would have recorded losses, highlighting the chronic dependence of 
farming on state aid. 
 
Table 1. Within-groups Estimates of the Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Variable Coefficient Robust s.e t-ratio p-value
Labour 0.129 0.057 2.270 0.024
Land and buildings 0.066 0.036 1.860 0.063
Livestock 0.172 0.041 4.160 0.000
Other purchased inputs 0.384 0.077 4.950 0.000
Dummy 2001/02 0.086 0.019 4.500 0.000
Dummy 2002/03 0.075 0.022 3.470 0.001
Dummy 2003/04 0.134 0.019 6.940 0.000
Dummy 2004/05 0.045 0.019 2.320 0.021
Constant 3.921 1.030 3.810 0.000
Overall R2 = 0.964 Within-groups R2 =0.133 Between-groups R2 =0.997 
Sample size = 1942 F(8,1387) = 16.19 Number of groups = 546 
Notes: The dependent variable in the model is the value of farm output, excluding direct 
payments, other grants and subsidies. The explanatory variables are: (i) total labour use in 
annual work units (ii) cost of land and buildings, including the imputed cost of owner-
occupied land (iii) value of livestock capital, defined as the average of the opening and 
closing valuations (iv) cost of all other purchased inputs, covering the FAS machinery, crop, 
livestock and miscellaneous cost categories (v) dummy variables for the years 2001/02 
through 2004/05, with 2000/01 defined as the base year. The data on costs and values are 
deflated by the relevant Agricultural Price Index (base year=2000; online: 
http://statistics.defra.gov.uk/esg/datasets/apiyear.xls), except for those on land costs and 
livestock values for which dedicated price indices by farm type and by livestock type 
respectively are constructed from the FAS panel. All variables other than the year dummies 
are expressed in natural logarithms.  Fixed effects are not reported.  
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Table 2. Weighted Summary Statistics by Year and Farm Type, 2000/01–2004/05 
By year for all farm types 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
 Average per farm 
Number of observations 450 386 376 444 460
Farm business size (ESU) 63 63 64 53 54
Post-transfer income (£) 28641 29523 27610 36570 36327
Proportion of  farms <0 6.3% 8.4% 9.7% 4.0% 5.9%
Gross support (£) 41975 42631 46771 49711 57007
Of which due to:-  
Market price support 16712 17272 19041 20514 20529
Direct support payments 20627 20226 22154 24579 29357
Other grants and subsidies 4636 5133 5575 4618 7121
Transfers to farmers (£) 28337 28112 30260 31909 37878
Of which due to:-  
Market price support 9497 9710 10589 11686 11629
Direct support payments 16254 15522 16766 17879 22811
Other grants and subsidies 2586 2880 2905 2344 3437
As % of post-transfer income 99% 95% 110% 87% 104%
Pre-transfer income (£)  304 1411 -2650 4661 -1551
Proportion of  farms <0 57.6% 56.9% 58.2% 52.4% 56.7%
By farm type for all years 
All Cereals
General 
Cropping Dairy
Specialist
Sheep
Specialist 
Cattle 
Mixed 
Cattle & 
Sheep Mixed
 Annual average per farm 
Number of observations 423 32 47 58 50 100 80 32
% of raised sample 15.8% 12.8% 10.3% 10.0% 22.8% 16.7% 15.8%
Farm business size (ESU) 59 60 107 96 25 40 44 59
Post-transfer income (£) 31734 29065 43338 53748 16325 26116 28424 31853
Proportion of  farms <0 6.9% 16.8% 4.6% 0.7% 4.1% 5.8% 5.8% 5.9%
Gross support (£) 47619 30671 38723 69859 28545 52084 54360 58000
Of which due to:-   
Market price support 18814 4920 11124 58045 6017 20350 18028 20611
Direct support payments 23389 25066 26391 10285 13106 24514 25391 32621
Other grants and subsidies 5417 685 1207 1530 9423 7220 10941 4769
Transfers to farmers (£) 31299 19369 23530 40750 21569 36432 37217 36858
Of which due to:-   
Market price support 10622 2745 6037 33059 3462 11633 10155 11393
Direct support payments 17847 16227 16781 6562 12778 20890 22338 22548
Other grants and subsidies 2830 397 712 1129 5329 3909 4724 2917
As % of post-transfer income 98.6% 66.6% 54.3% 75.8% 132.1 139.5 130.9 115.7
Pre-transfer income (£)  435 9696 19808 12998 -5244 -10316 -8793 -5005
Proportion of farms <0 56.4% 39.6% 24.2% 31.8% 67.8% 78.5% 73.6% 56.2%
Source: Own calculations using FAS data.   
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 The lower panel of Table 2 presents comparable summary information for the seven 
distinct farm types identified in the analysis.14  Post-transfer income levels were highest on 
dairy farms, and lowest on specialist grazing livestock farms which are typically smaller 
businesses on poor quality land.  Direct payments provided the main source of both support 
and transfers for all farm types other than dairy, with payments based on areas planted 
accounting for the bulk of support on arable farms and payments based on livestock numbers 
doing likewise on sheep and cattle farms.  Gross support varied across types, with dairy farms 
receiving the highest and specialist sheep farms the lowest levels of support on average.  
Average transfers to farmers follow a broadly similar pattern but differences in average 
transfer efficiency rates lead to a lower degree of variation across farm types.  Overall, the 
dispersion of average incomes by farm type was lower for post-transfer incomes than for pre-
transfer incomes, implying that the provision of support generally served to reduce rather than 
exacerbate income disparities between farm types in Scotland.  OECD (2003, Part I) reports 
that the provision of support typically increases average income disparities between farm 
types, but that this is not the case in all countries.   
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the reference functions using the non-parametric 
estimation results for 2000/01.  The top panel provides a scatterplot of the data on pre-transfer 
and post-transfer incomes, overlaid by the non-discriminatory reference function hB(x) and the 
linear regression of post-transfer on pre-transfer incomes.  The plot shows that higher post-
transfer incomes are generally associated with higher pre-transfer incomes and that the non-
parametric regression model fits the data better than the linear model.  The latter point is 
reinforced by the regression summary statistics reported in Table 3, which show that the 
predictive power of the non-parametric model, defined as the square of the correlation 
coefficient between the fitted and observed values (see Zheng and Agresti, 2000), is superior 
to that of the linear model in all years.  Pre-transfer income is highly significant in the linear 
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Figure 1.  Non-parametric reference functions 
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Table 3. Summary statistics from reference function regressions 
 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Predictive power of:   
Linear regression model 0.626 0.540 0.297 0.612 0.340
Non-discriminatory reference function hB(x) 0.738 0.654 0.465 0.680 0.510
Farm type specific reference function hW(x) 0.805 0.749 0.625 0.761 0.627
   
F test of:   
Pre-transfer income effect in the linear model  751.3 452.1 158.3 699.6 236.2
 (6.7) (6.7) (6.7) (6.7) (6.7)
Linearity in the non-discriminatory function hB(x) 77.2 71.8 68.5 47.8 48.5
 (7.0) (8.2) (8.4) (8.4) (4.8)
Farm type effects in the farm type function hW(x) 6.4 4.9 6.8 13.9 5.7
 (2.1) (2.0) (2.1) (5.2) (2.1)
Critical values for 1% significance of the F statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
model, but the assumption of linearity is consistently rejected in favour of the non-
discriminatory function using an F test procedure (Cleveland and Devlin, 1988, p.599).   
 The bottom panel of Figure 1 displays the non-discriminatory function hB(x) together 
with the set of farm type reference functions gk(xk).  The figure shows some divergence of the 
farm type functions about the non-discriminatory function, but the same positive association 
between post-transfer and pre-transfer incomes is generally apparent for each farm type over 
the observed range of pre-transfer incomes.  From Table 3, the predictive power of the set of 
farm type functions is consistently superior to that of the non-discriminatory function.  The F 
test procedure rejects the set of restrictions implicit in the pooled non-discriminatory function 
in all years, implying that farm type had a significant influence on the level of post-transfer 
income conditional on pre-transfer income.  
 Table 4 presents the main findings of the study.  Absolute inequality in post-transfer farm 
incomes is shown to have been substantial with the average absolute income differential 
between farms comparable in size to average income levels throughout the period.  In 
comparison, the distribution of pre-transfer income exhibited somewhat lower levels of 
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absolute inequality.  The provision of support thus increased absolute income differentials as 
indicated by the negative values of the index of net redistributive effect R which are all 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level or higher.  Overall, agricultural policy 
increased average income disparities by between 10 and 30 per cent depending on the year.  
 
Table 4.  Redistributive effects of agricultural support policy, 1995/96-1999/00 
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
Absolute Gini index of  AY 15754 16350 14299 16532 17788
post-transfer income (1214) (853) (793) (915) (897)
Absolute Gini index of  AW 12324 12788 10197 12868 12266
farm type specific reference income (1341) (981) (973) (1128) (1038)
Absolute Gini index of  AB 11596 11257 7701 12008 10550
non-discriminatory reference income (1441) (1095) (1206) (1282) (1245)
Absolute concentration index of  By CB 11440 11240 7503 12005 10217
non-discriminatory reference income (1500) (1300) (1449) (1421) (1505)
Absolute Gini index of  AX 14188 13212 10664 13730 13473
pre-transfer income (1030) (818) (649) (759) (796)
Index of redistributive effect R -1566 -3137 -3635 -2802 -4315
 (659) (703) (795) (578) (857)
Index of vertical redistribution V 2748 1972 3161 1725 3256
    (898) (960) (1511) (1110) (1366)
Disparity of net transfers D 0.097 0.068 0.102 0.053 0.087
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030)
Mean non-discriminatory transfers Bt 28325 28949 30987 32638 37557
 (2257) (2380) (2831) (2748) (3147)
Index of systematic reranking HR -156 -17 -198 -3 -334
(281) (538) (574) (322) (659)
Total classical horizontal inequity -4159 -5093 -6598 -4524 -7238
 (600) (744) (1034) (728) (894)
Of which:      Between farm type HB -728 -1531 -2496 -860 -1716
 (409) (487) (664) (454) (646)
    Within farm type HW -3431 -3561 -4101 -3664 -5522
 (394) (496) (647) (478) (585)
Notes: Own calculations using FAS data.  All measures are calculated using the population-
weighted data.  Absolute Gini and concentration indices are estimated using the formulae in 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1989) for weighted samples.  Panel bootstrap standard errors, based on 
1000 replications, are reported in parentheses and reflect not only the inherent sampling 
variability of the measures but also the need to estimate both factor cost shares and the set of 
reference functions in order to calculate them. 
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 The decomposition of R reveals four main points of interest.  First, the distribution of 
non-discriminatory support was progressive in absolute terms, as indicated by the positive 
values of the disparity index D.  By implication, farmers with negative or low pre-transfer 
incomes received more than an equal share of non-discriminatory transfers.  This finding may 
appear surprising in the light of the commonplace observation that support is largely 
proportionate to the volume of production (see, for example, EC, 1991).  But, gross support, 
transfers and non-discriminatory transfers are negatively not positively correlated with pre-
transfer incomes, given that many farmers have to engage in otherwise loss-making activities 
in order to benefit from support. 
 Second, agricultural policy would have reduced the degree of absolute inequality in the 
distribution of farm incomes had it not been for horizontal inequities in the provision of 
support.  The progressive distribution of non-discriminatory transfers results in the positive 
index of vertical redistribution V.  However this positive gross redistributive effect was more 
than offset by the combined effects of the various sources of horizontal inequity, as measured 
by the indices HR, HB and HW.  Annual transfers could have been cut by between about £4000 
and £8000 per farm with no effect on welfare if it had been possible to devise a horizontally 
equitable support regime.  These findings point to the importance of taking horizontal 
inequities into account in any consideration of the redistributive performance of agricultural 
policy.  
Third, the unequal treatment of pre-transfer income equals was the dominant source of 
horizontal inequities, with none of the estimates of the systematic reranking effect 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  This is not to say that the unequal treatment 
of pre-transfer income equals did not result in substantial reranking of farms between the pre-
transfer and post-transfer income distributions, for which Allanson (2005a, 2006) provide 
ample evidence.  Rather, once account has been taken of classical horizontal inequities in the 
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provision of support, the results provide no evidence of systematic reranking due to the 
existence of income traps in the non-discriminatory function hB(x), whereby an increase in 
pre-transfer income over some range is associated with a decrease in expected post-transfer 
income.  Moreover, there is little evidence of such traps in the farm type functions either, with 
systematic reranking accounting for no more than one third of total horizontal inequities 
within any one farm type in any year, and only 6.6% on average over all types and years. 
Finally, the redistributive effect of within farm type HI consistently exceeds that of 
between farm type HI, though the estimates of the latter are significantly different from zero 
at the 10% level or higher in all years.  The former arises from the dispersion of post-transfer 
incomes about farm type reference incomes hW(x), whereas the latter stems from systematic 
divergences between farm type and non-discriminatory reference incomes, hW(x) and hB(x) 
respectively.  The results therefore imply that factors other than farm type were dominant in 
determining differences in the value of transfers received by individual farms with a particular 
level of pre-transfer income.  Nevertheless there is evidence of systematic discrimination 
between farm types in the provision of support, which operated to the particular advantage of 
dairy and cattle farms and to the detriment of arable and sheep farms.15  By implication, the 
disparities in average transfers reported in Table 3 are not solely due to differences in the 
distribution of pre-transfer incomes across farm types. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The principal focus of the paper is the characterisation and measurement of the redistributive 
effects of agricultural policy.  One possible criticism of such an exercise is that the 
distribution of agricultural policy transfers reflects goals other than farm income support, such 
as those to do with the environment, sustainability and rural development.  However measures 
specifically targeted to these other objectives still only account for a relatively small share of 
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the gross value of support for Scottish agriculture, whereas the direct support payments that 
were introduced by the 1992 reform of the CAP and now account for the bulk of transfers, 
had the stated objective of compensating farmers for the adverse income effects of cuts in 
support prices.  The European Commission has for many years expressed concerns about the 
inequitable distribution of income support (EC, 1991, 1997, 2002) and in the recent Mid Term 
Review of Agenda 2000 made various proposals to improve the targeting of direct support 
payments (EC, 2002, 2003).  More generally, the measurement of redistributive effects may 
usefully inform the design of agricultural support policy by suggesting ways in which it might 
be made more effective as a redistributive tool, even though this is only one of several criteria 
by which to evaluate policy performance.  
The redistributive effect of agricultural policy is measured as the difference between the 
absolute Gini indices of pre-transfer and post-transfer incomes.  This is a measure of the 
change in absolute inequality, which provides a benchmark of distributional neutrality more in 
accord with both public and official perceptions of fairness in the distribution of agricultural 
support than one based on the concept of relative inequality.  The measure may be interpreted 
as the monetary value per farm of the change in inequality due to the provision of support.  
Moreover it is shown that it may be decomposed into a vertical redistribution effect and 
various HI components, and thus serves not only to quantify but also to characterise the 
redistributive effect of agricultural policy.   
The measure is used to explore the effects of agricultural policy on the distribution of 
Scottish farm incomes over the period 2000/01 to 2004/05.  The empirical results show that 
the provision of support increased the average size of farm income differentials throughout 
the period.  Nevertheless, the vertical stance of agricultural policy was consistently 
progressive in absolute terms, with non-discriminatory transfers decreasing in pre-transfer 
incomes.  And it is only because of the adverse distributional effects of horizontal inequities 
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that the provision of farm income support did not in fact reduce absolute inequality.  The 
results further demonstrate that the main source of these inequities was the unequal treatment 
of pre-transfer income equals rather than the systematic reranking of farms between the pre-
transfer and expected post-transfer income distributions.  Moreover, the main factor 
underlying such classical horizontal inequities was the weakness of the relationships between 
transfers and pre-transfer incomes within each farm type, rather than systematic 
discrimination between types due to the commodity organisation of agricultural policy.   
The imperfect targeting of support revealed by the empirical findings has implications for 
the design of agricultural policy.  Historically, the wide variation in transfer levels between 
farms with similar pre-transfer incomes suggests that policies designed to limit the size of 
production-related payments to larger farms would have been largely ineffective as a means to 
concentrate support on those farms capable of generating only low levels of farm income.  
Moreover, there seems to have been only limited scope to improve targeting through either 
the elimination of income traps in transfer schedules or the rebalancing of support across 
commodity regimes, given that neither systematic reranking nor systematic discrimination 
between farm types appears to be the main source of horizontal inequities.  Looking to the 
future, the decoupling of direct support payments will break the link between current 
production choices and the receipt of subsidies, with farmers merely required to keep their 
land in good agricultural and environmental condition.  In the case of Scotland, this is likely 
to further weaken the relationship between support and pre-transfer incomes because 
entitlements to the new decoupled payment will be “grandfathered” on the basis of historical 
payment receipts.  More generally, the impact of decoupling on the potential for targeting 
support in an efficient and effective manner will depend on the strength of the correlation 
between the indicator employed to determine payment entitlements and (post-decoupling) 
pre-transfer income. 
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Footnotes 
1  Losses have often been treated as nuisance items in agricultural income distribution studies 
with one common practice being to set all negative incomes to zero (see, for example, 
Ahearn et al. 1985) even though this will obviously bias resultant measures of inequality 
(Schutz 1951).   
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1  where yi is the income of observation i (i=1,..N). 
3  The Lorenz curve of hW(x) will lie everywhere on or above that of y since hW(x) may be 
obtained from y through a series of progressive mean-preserving transfers (Dasgupta et 
al., 1973).  Hence the inequality of hW(x) will be equal to or lower than that of y, since the 
absolute Gini coefficient satisfies the weak principle of transfers and HW  will be non-
positive.  However, this condition may not necessarily hold exactly in any finite sample of 
farms drawn from the population. 
4  This follows because the Lorenz curve of hB(x) will lie everywhere on or above that of 
hW(x) as hB(x) is a weighted average of the gk(x) functions (Kakwani and Lambert, 1999). 
5  CB is defined in relation to the concentration curve obtained by plotting the cumulative 
proportion of non-discriminatory post-transfer income against the cumulative proportion 
of the population ranked by without-support income in the same way that G is defined in 
relation to the ordinary Lorenz curve.  Note that CB = GB if the ranking of farms by pre-
transfer and non-discriminatory post-transfer incomes is identical. 
 
 26
 
6  One can also measure the extent of systematic reranking induced within each farm type by 
the individual farm type reference functions in (1).  However aggregation of these 
measures across types to yield an overall reranking index is problematic.  Between type 
classical HI is therefore identified prior to the reranking effect, rather than vice versa. 
7  CTB  is defined analogously to CB.  Note that CTB  will be negative (positive) if farmers with 
low pre-transfer incomes receive a larger (smaller) share of support than those with high 
ones, and will equal zero for a universal flat-rate benefit. 
8  To check the sensitivity of the empirical findings to the choice of variable span, results 
were also derived using spans 50% smaller and 50% larger than that chosen by the 
smoother.  The resultant redistributive effect estimates were very similar to those reported 
in the paper, confirming the conclusions about the nature and significance of horizontal 
inequities in the provision of support. 
9 Farms that were directly affected by foot and mouth disease (FMD) culls and 
compensation are excluded from the analysis, but the resultant sub-samples for 2001/02 
and 2002/03 are nevertheless sufficient “to give a representative picture of full-time 
Scottish farm businesses” in these years (SEERAD, 2003, 2004). 
10 The sampling frame excludes small farms less than 8 Economic Size Units (ESUs) prior 
to 2003/04 and 0.5 Standard Labour Requirements (SLRs) thereafter; specialist livestock 
units larger than 200 ESU prior to 2003/04; and certain minor farm types (most notably 
horticulture and specialist pigs and poultry farms).   
11  This group may include not only the farmer and spouse but also non-principal partners 
and directors and their spouses and family workers. 
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12 These schemes are listed in the Annex to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 and 
include the Arable Area Payment, Sheep Annual Premium, Suckler Cow Premium, Beef 
Special Premium and Extensification Payment schemes. 
13 Ideally, it would have been possible to specify a common technology for each farm type 
but reliable estimates of the output elasticities could not be obtained on this basis due to 
the limited number of observations on some farm types. 
14 The farm type classification in all years is based on ‘1988’ standard gross margins to 
ensure comparability over time.  Cereals, general cropping, dairy and mixed farm types 
are identical to the eponymous UK robust types. The specialist sheep farm type 
corresponds to EC type 441, specialist cattle to EC types 421 and 422 combined, and 
cattle & sheep to EC types 431, 432, 442 and 444 (as implemented in the UK) combined.  
See DEFRA (2002, Appendix 2) for further description of the classification scheme. 
15   Discrimination is taken to be to the advantage (detriment) of a particular farm type if the 
weighted average value of hW(x) for that farm type is greater (less) than that of hB(x). 
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